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I. The Current State of Commercial Speech
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution
prohibits the abridgment of the freedom of speech.2 The due
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances").
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process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes this provi-
sion applicable to state and local governments. 3 Speech that is
protected by the First Amendment can rarely be regulated
based on the content of that speech. 4 This means that the Gov-
ernment may not stifle a speaker merely because it does not
like, or agree with, the message.5 The freedom of speech is safe-
guarded so that people may speak their minds with falsehoods
being exposed through education and discussion. 6 This protec-
tion is essential to free government.7 Even some false and mis-
leading statements are entitled to First Amendment protection
in order to eliminate the risk of undue censorship and the sup-
pression of truthful material.8 However, commercial speech
that is false or misleading is not entitled to First Amendment
protection and "may be prohibited entirely."9 Therefore, the
state and federal governments are free to prevent the dissemi-
nation of commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or
misleading.' 0
A. Protection of Commercial Speech
Until 1975, commercial speech was not considered a pro-
tected form of speech." The government was free to regulate
commercial speech in any way it saw fit. This changed when
the United States Supreme Court held, in Bigelow v. Virginia,
that it was an error to assume that advertising was not entitled
to First Amendment protection.' 2 One year later, in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held that a ban on
advertising prescription drug prices violated the First Amend-
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
4. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); Con-
sol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980).
5. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 67 (1976).
6. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940).
7. Id.
8. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 172 (1979); Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 95 ("Nox-
ious doctrines in [the fields of politics and economics] may be refuted and their evil
averted by the courageous exercise of the right of free discussion.").
9. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
10. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
11. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 250 (Cal. 2002).
12. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825 (1975).
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ment. 13 It further held that "the free flow of commercial infor-
mation is indispensable" not only "to the proper allocation of
resources in a free enterprise system," but also "to the forma-
tion of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be
regulated or altered."14
While the First Amendment protects commercial speech,
commercial speech is afforded less protection than noncommer-
cial speech. 15 Noncommercial speech may only be regulated
based on its content if the regulation can survive strict scru-
tiny.16 Strict scrutiny requires that the regulation be narrowly
tailored to promote a compelling government interest.17 In com-
parison, in 1980 the Court laid down a four-part test in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission to
determine when commercial speech, that is neither false nor
misleading, may be regulated.' Under the "Central Hudson
Test" the government is free to prohibit commercial speech that
it deems false or misleading.19 The Supreme Court allows con-
tent based regulation of commercial speech because (1) commer-
cial speakers have enough knowledge of the market and their
product to evaluate the accuracy of the message;20 (2) commer-
cial speech is based on economic self-interest and therefore is
not "particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad reg-
ulation;"21 and (3) the government interest in preventing com-
mercial harm justifies the power to regulate speech that is
"linked inextricably" to those transactions. 22
13. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 772 (1976).
.14. Id. at 765.
15. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983).
16. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000);
Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980).
17. Id.
18. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
19. Id. at 566.
20. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976).
21. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564 n.6 (quoting Bates v.
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977)).
22. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996).
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B. What is Commercial Speech?
Since commercial speech can be regulated for its content
but noncommercial speech may not, the determination must be
made fairly early as to whether the speech is commercial or
noncommercial. In Central Hudson, the Court articulated two
definitions of commercial speech. 23 The Court first describes
commercial speech as "expression[s] related solely to the eco-
nomic interest of the speaker and its audience,"24 and then later
as "speech proposing a commercial transaction."25 However,
even at that time, Justices Stevens and Brennan found these
definitions problematic. 26 This lack of a clear definition has cre-
ated a "gray area" that has left many speakers and courts un-
clear as to what exactly commercial speech is.
In Board of Trustees, State University of New York v. Fox,
the Court held that the test for identifying commercial speech
was whether that speech proposed a commercial transaction.27
But the Court has identified certain types of speech as commer-
cial even though the speech in question does not obviously pro-
pose a commercial transaction. The Court has accepted that a
statement of alcohol content on a bottle of beer 28 and statements
on an attorney's letterhead identifying the attorney as a CPA
(certified public accountant) and a CFP (certified financial plan-
ner)29 were commercial speech.
1. Is an Advertisement Commercial Speech?
While many advertisements are classic examples of com-
mercial speech, an advertisement is not necessarily commercial
speech. In New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court held that the
advertisement at issue was not commercial speech because it
"communicated information, expressed opinion, recited griev-
23. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S 557.
24. Id. at 561.
25. Id. at 562.
26. See id. at 579 (Stevens, J. concurring).
27. Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473 (1989).
28. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (in this case both
parties agreed that the information on the can was commercial, and therefore the
Court does not discuss its reasoning behind this finding).
29. See Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Profl Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy,
512 U.S. 136, 142 (1994) (the Court does not discuss its reasoning behind this
finding).
20031
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ances, [and] protested claimed abuses .... "3 In Sullivan, the
New York Times had run a full-page advertisement entitled
"Heed Their Rising Voices," which appealed for funds to support
a civil rights campaign. 31 The Court found it immaterial that
the advertisement was a paid one. 32 It reasoned that to hold
otherwise would "shut off an important outlet for the promulga-
tion of information and ideas by persons who do not ... have
access to publishing facilities .. .33
2. Is a Pamphlet Commercial Speech?
A key case in analyzing the definition of commercial speech
is Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.34 In Bolger, a federal
law prohibited the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for
contraceptives. The speaker, Youngs, was a prophylactic manu-
facturer and the public issue involved was venereal disease and
family planning.35 The information pamphlet affected by the
prohibition did more than propose a commercial transaction.
These pamphlets discussed the availability of prophylactics in
general, and Youngs' product in particular.36 The Court found
that the mere fact that these pamphlets were advertisements
did not make them commercial speech.37 The Court reasoned
that sometimes advertisements are used to convey political or
other messages that are unrelated to a commercial transac-
tion.38 The Court also found that references to specific products
and the speaker's economic motivation alone were insufficient
to convert the statements into commercial speech. 39 The Court
held, however, that these three factors in combination-adver-
tising format, product references, and commercial motivation-
provided "strong support" for characterizing speech as commer-
cial. 40 In Bolger, the Court found all three factors present and
30. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
31. Id. at 256.
32. Id. at 266.
33. Id.
34. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
35. Id. at 68.
36. Id. at 62.
37. Id. at 66.
38. Id.
39. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67.
40. Id. at 67.
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concluded that the speech at issue was commercial speech. 41 In
a footnote, the Court cautioned that each one of these factors
may not be necessary in order for speech to be deemed commer-
cial.42 In a separate footnote the Court noted even though a
product is referred to generally, the speech might still be com-
mercial if the company had such control over the market that it
could promote its product without reference to its own brand
name.
43
3. Combination Speech: Commercial Speech Linked with
Noncommercial Speech
In 1983, the Bolger Court held that statements may be
commercial speech regardless of the fact that they "contain dis-
cussions of important public issues."44 Additionally, it held that
advertising that links a product to a current public debate is not
entitled to the constitutional protection afforded noncommercial
speech.45 The Court did not want to allow advertisers to immu-
nize false and misleading product information from government
regulations simply by including references to public issues.46
The 1988 case, Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of
North Carolina, addressed commercial speech that was "inextri-
cably intertwined" with noncommercial speech.47 In Riley, the
North Carolina Charitable Solicitation Act required fundraisers
to disclose the average percentage of gross receipts actually
turned over to charities by the fundraiser for all charitable so-
licitations conducted in North Carolina within the preceding
twelve months.48 A coalition of professional fundraisers, chari-
table organizations, and potential charitable donors brought
suit against the government seeking injunctive and charitable
relief on the grounds that the statute infringed upon their free-
dom of speech. 49 The District Court for the Eastern District of
41. Id. at 68.
42. Id. at 67 n.14.
43. Id. at 66 n.13.
44. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67-68.
45. Id. at 68 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5).
46. Id.
47. See Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
48. Id. at 786.
49. Id. at 787.
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North Carolina found this aspect of the statute unconstitutional
and enjoined its enforcement. 50 The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed. 51 The United States Supreme Court
affirmed, finding the statute unconstitutional. 52 The state ar-
gued that the provision, which required disclosure of the per-
centage of gross receipts actually turned over to the charity,
should be analyzed as a regulation on commercial speech.53 The
state's position was that the speech was commercial because it
related to the fundraiser's profit.54 The Court refrained from
deciding that speech is necessarily commercial merely because
a person has a financial motivation for speaking. 55 The Court
held that even assuming, without deciding, that the speech was
commercial, the speech did not retain its commercial character
because it was "inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully
protected speech."5 6 To "parcel out the speech" would be "artifi-
cial and impractical."57 Since all the speech was afforded full
First Amendment protection, the state could not compel the
speaker to disclose anything.58 The First Amendment protects
both what the speaker says and what the speaker decides not to
say.59
In the 1989 case Board of Trustees of the State University of
New York v. Fox,60 a company called America Future Systems
("AFS") wanted to hold a "Tupperware" style party6' in a State
University of New York ("SUNY" or "the University") dormitory
in order to sell dinnerware to the students. The University pro-
hibited private commercial enterprises from operating on cam-
pus, unless specifically contracted for by the University.62 An
AFS representative was conducting a demonstration in a SUNY
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Riley, 487 U.S. at 796.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 795.
56. Id. at 796.
57. Riley, 487 U.S. at 796.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 796-97.
60. Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
61. A "Tupperware" party consists of a "demonstration and offering of prod-
ucts for sale to groups of ten or more prospective buyers at gatherings assembled
and hosted by one of the prospective buyers." Id. at 472.
62. Id. at 471-72.
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dormitory. She was asked to leave and when she refused she
was arrested for trespassing, soliciting without a permit, and
loitering.63 At the party the students would have seen a product
demonstration and discussed how to be financially responsible
and run an efficient home. 64 The students brought suit seeking
a declaratory judgment that the University violated their First
Amendment rights by prohibiting the AFS demonstration. 65
The students argued that since the speech proposing a commer-
cial transaction (the product demonstration) was combined with
pure speech (the information on household economics) the
speech in its entirety should be considered noncommercial
speech.6 6 In this case, the Court found that the noncommercial
speech on home economics was not "inextricably intertwined"
with the commercial Tupperware sales pitch.67 In other words,
it was not impossible to sell the dinnerware without teaching
home economics, or to teach home economics without selling
dinnerware, and therefore the sales pitch was not converted to
noncommercial educational speech. 68
The Court has acknowledged that "ambiguities may exist
at the margins of the category of commercial speech."69 In Jus-
tice Stevens' concurrence in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., he sug-
gested that the distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech should not rest solely on the form or con-
tent of the statement, or the motive of the speaker, but instead
should rest on the relationship between the speech at issue and
the justification for distinguishing the two forms of speech.70
4. Protection of False & Misleading Statements
The Court has held that there is no constitutional value in
false statements of fact since false statements do not materially
advance society's interest in "uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open debate on public issues."7' The Court has specifically held
63. Id. at 472.
64. Id. at 474.
65. Fox, 492 U.S. at 472.
66. Id. at 474.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 765 (1993).
70. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 493.
71. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
2003] 365
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that "the States and Federal Government are free to prevent
the dissemination of commercial speech that is false, deceptive,
or misleading."72 However, in some cases, the First Amend-
ment imposes restraints on lawsuits seeking damages for inju-
rious falsehoods "to eliminate the risk of undue self-censorship
and the suppression of truthful material."73
In New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court held this re-
straint gives the freedom of expression the "breathing space" its
needs to survive. 74 In that case the New York Times had run a
full-page advertisement entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices,"
which described a "wave of terror" undertaken by those opposed
to the civil rights group and solicited funds. 75 The advertise-
ment specifically spoke of an event allegedly involving the
plaintiff, Sullivan, that he claimed was false, and therefore
libelous.7 6 It was uncontroverted that the descriptions of some
of the events were not accurate.77 The manager of Advertising
Acceptability at the New York Times accepted the advertise-
ment because he knew of nothing that would lead him to believe
that anything contained in the advertisement was false.78 No
one at the Times made any effort to check the accuracy of the
statements in the advertisement.7 9 The Supreme Court of Ala-
bama affirmed the trial courts decisions that the statements
were "libelous per se," and the defendants could be found liable
if the jury found that statements were made "of and concerning"
Sullivan.80 The Supreme Court further held that "[t]he First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not protect libelous
publications . ... "81 The United States Supreme Court held
that the rule of law applied by the Alabama courts was "consti-
tutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for free-
dom of speech and of the press that are required by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments in a libel action brought by a pub-
72. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985).
73. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 172 (1979).
74. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272.
75. Id. at 256-57.
76. Id. at 256.
77. Id. at 258.
78. Id. at 260-62.
79. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 261.
80. Id. at 262.
81. Id. at 264 (internal quotations omitted).
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lic official against critics of his official conduct."8 2 The Court
further held that "erroneous statements [are] inevitable in free
debate," and "must be protected if the freedoms of expression
are to have the breathing space that they need to survive."83
Therefore, "some false and misleading statements are enti-
tled to First Amendment protection .... "84 On the contrary,
speech, which does not concern public issues and is "wholly
false and clearly damaging," is not entitled to First Amendment
protection and may be prohibited entirely.8 5
II. Kasky v. Nike, Inc.
The definition of commercial speech most recently became
an issue in a California Supreme Court case decided in May
2002, Kasky v. Nike, Inc.86
A. Facts
The defendant Nike is a $9.9 billion athletic apparel and
running shoe corporation.8 7 Nike uses subcontractors to manu-
facture most of its products.88 These subcontractors are located
in China, Vietnam, and Indonesia.8 9 Under an agreement with
the subcontractors, Nike assumed responsibility for the subcon-
tractor's compliance with local laws and regulations. 90 Begin-
ning in October 1996, Nike began to receive bad publicity in
print and broadcast media for the labor practices in the South-
east Asia factories. 91 Nike responded to the bad publicity
82. Id.
83. Id. at 271-72 (internal quotations omitted).
84. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 495 (1995).
85. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
86. Kasky, 45 P.3d 243.
87. David Sokal, Where the Boys Aren't, SHOPPING CENTER WORLD, Nov. 1,
2002, at 34.
88. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 247.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 247-48.
91. Id. at 248. Some of the media outlets that featured stories about Nike's
labor practices were 48 Hours, the Financial Times, The New York Times, the San
Francisco Chronicle, the Buffalo News, the Oregonian, the Kansas City Star, and
the Sporting News. Id. The publications alleged that the factories that produced
Nike's products paid less than the applicable local minimum wage, required em-
ployees to work overtime, allowed and encouraged employees to work more over-
time than allowed by local law, subjected employees to physical, verbal, and sexual
2003] 367
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through public relations material, including: press releases, let-
ters to editors, and letters to university presidents and athletic
directors.9 2 Nike's press material defended its labor practices,
citing specific examples of its employment practices.93 Nike
also bought a full page advertisement to publicize a report that
GoodWorks International had prepared under a contract with
Nike, stating that GoodWorks has not found evidence of illegal
or unsafe working conditions at Nike factories in China, Viet-
nam, or Indonesia.94
The plaintiff, Marc Kasky, is a San Francisco activist who
decided to sue Nike for making false and misleading statements
of fact after reading a New York Times article about Nike's la-
bor practices. 95 Kasky was authorized to bring suit under Cali-
fornia's Business and Professions Code sections 17204 and
17535.96 Kasky had previously initiated two other class actions
suits against corporations alleging false advertising. 97
B. Issue
The central issue in Kasky v. Nike was whether the speech
involved was commercial in nature. Determining the type of
speech involved determines the level of protection this speech is
entitled to.98 Commercial speech receives a lesser degree of pro-
tection than noncommercial speech and may be entirely prohib-
abuse, and exposed employees to toxic chemicals, noise, heat, and dust in violation
of local health and safety regulations. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 248.
92. Id.
93. Id. Nike's response to these allegations was that the workers that make
Nike products were protected from physical and sexual abuse, were paid double
the applicable local minimum wage, and received free meals and health care. Nike
further stated that working conditions were in compliance with applicable local
laws and regulations. Id.
94. Id.
95. Rosemary Feitelberg & Joanna Ramey, Nike Case Questions Issues of Free
Speech (and false advertising), WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, Jan. 23, 2002, at 3.
96. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 249. Both section 17200 and section 17500 authorize
any person acting for the interests of the general public to bring an action for re-
lief Id.
97. One lawsuit was against Perrier after the company admitted to adding
carbonation to its water, and one was against a frozen food producer who advertis-
ing its vegetables as "California style" when the food actually came from Mexico.
Both cases settled out of court. Feitelberg & Ramey, supra note 95.
98. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 248.
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ited if it is found to be false or misleading. 99 Noncommercial
speech is entitled to full First Amendment protection and can-
not be regulated based on its falsity.100
C. Superior Court
Kasky alleged that Nike made false and misleading state-
ments of fact about its labor practices within its press materials
because of its negligence and carelessness.'10 Nike argued that
the statements contained in the press materials were not com-
mercial speech because they were part of "an international me-
dia debate on issues of intense public interest."10 2 Kasky sought
to disgorge Nike of "all monies.., acquired by means of any act
found.., to be an unlawful and/or unfair business practice" and
to obtain an injunction requiring Nike to undertake a "public-
information campaign."10 3 Nike demurred on the grounds that
Kasky "failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action" and that the relief Kasky was seeking was barred by the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution. 0 4 The Su-
perior Court found that Nike's statements were noncommercial
and therefore were protected by the First Amendment.10 5
Based on this reasoning, it sustained Nike's demurs and dis-
missed the complaint. 0 6 Kasky appealed from the judgment. 0 7
D. Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, concluding
that Nike's statements were noncommercial speech and there-
fore entitled to the greatest level of First Amendment protec-
99. Id. at 247.
100. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 495 (1995).
101. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 248. The plaintiff brought this suit under section
17200 of the California Business and Professional Code. Section 17200 is known
as California's "Little FTC Act" and parallels FTC Act § 5. The law defines unfair
competition as any "unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and
unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by
[§ 17500, the false advertising law]." Id. at 249.
102. Id. at 259.
103. Id. at 248.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 248-49.
106. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 248-49.
107. Id. at 249.
2003] 369
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tion.108 The Supreme Court of California granted the plaintiffs
petition for review. 10 9
E. The Supreme Court of California
The Supreme Court of California reversed, finding that the
public relations statements qualified as "commercial speech for
the purposes of applying state laws barring false and mislead-
ing commercial messages."110 The court held that "when a court
must decide whether particular speech may be subjected to laws
aimed at preventing false advertising or other forms of commer-
cial deception, categorizing a particular statement as commer-
cial or noncommercial speech requires consideration of three
elements: the speaker, the intended audience, and the content
of the message.""' The court determined that Nike's state-
ments were commercial since the statements were (1) directed
by a commercial speaker; (2) to a commercial audience; and (3)
the speaker made "representations of fact about the speaker's
own business operations for the purpose of promoting the sale of
its products .... "112
1. The Supreme Court of California's Reasoning
a. Determining What is Commercial Speech
The California Supreme Court reasoned that since commer-
cial speech is speech proposing a commercial transaction, it fol-
lows that commercial speech is communication between parties
who engage in these transactions. 1 3 Based on this reasoning, it
held that commercial speech is speech by a commercial speaker
to a commercial audience." 4 The court then looked to the
Bolger factors of advertising format and economic motivation. 115
From the presence of these factors the court implied that com-
mercial speech is speech that is directed at persons who "may be
influenced by that speech to engage in a commercial transaction
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 247.
111. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 256.
112. Id. at 247.
113. Id. at 256.
114. Id. at 247.
115. Id. at 256.
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with the speaker . .. "116 The court reasoned that the factual
content of the message must be commercial. 117 They held that
factual content is commercial when it consists of information
about the speaker's business operations, products, or ser-
vices. 118 The court found this holding to be consistent with the
Bolger factor of product references." 9 The court interpreted
product references to mean any statement "about the manner in
which the products are manufactured, distributed, or sold,
about repair or warranty services . . . or about the identity or
qualifications of persons who manufacture, distribute, sell, ser-
vice, or endorse the product." 20 To support this definition the
California Supreme Court looked at the other cases where the
speaker was not clearly proposing a commercial transaction,
and yet the United States Supreme Court considered the speech
to be commercial. In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., the United
States Supreme Court accepted the parties' stipulation that a
statement of alcohol content on the label of a beer bottle was, in
fact, commercial speech. 121 The Court has also held that state-
ments on an attorney's letterhead and business cards identify-
ing the attorney as a CPA (certified public accountant) and a
CFP (certified financial planner) were commercial speech. 122 In
both of those cases, as in Kasky, the speaker was speaking
about attributes of their product that may induce someone to
purchase the product. Since the statements would induce a con-
sumer to purchase the product, they are by their nature com-
mercial. The court held that commercial speech is speech (1)
directed by a commercial speaker; (2) to a commercial audience;
and (3) the speaker made representations of fact about the
speaker's own business operations for the purpose of promoting
the sale of its products. 123
In applying its test, the California Supreme Court found
Nike's speech to be commercial. It concluded that the speaker,
116. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 256.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 247.
120. Id. at 257.
121. Rubin 514 U.S. at 481.
122. Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Profl Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512
U.S. 136, 142 (1994).
123. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 247.
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Nike, was commercial because it is engaged in commerce. 124 It
determined that there was an intended commercial audience
because (1) the letters sent to the university presidents and ath-
letic directors were addressed to actual or potential customers;
and (2) the letters to the editors, while addressed to the general
public, were intended to reach and influence actual and poten-
tial customers. 125 Finally, it found there were representations
of fact of a commercial nature because Nike was describing its
own business operations. 126
b. This Interpretation is Consistent with the Reason
False or Misleading Commercial Speech is
Not Protected
The court found this interpretation to be consistent with
the reasons the United States Supreme Court has denied First
Amendment protection to false or misleading commercial
speech. 127 Namely, that (1) the truth of commercial speech is
more easily verifiable by the disseminator, and (2) since com-
mercial speech is motivated by a desire for economic profit it is
less likely to be chilled by regulation. 28 The court based this
conclusion on the finding that Nike's statements were on mat-
ters within its own knowledge and thus, it was in a position to
readily verify the truth of the statements.' 29 It also found
Nike's statements to be "particularly hardy or durable" since
they were made in an effort to maintain sales or profits. 30 It
rationalized that if Nike becomes more cautious as a result of
this ruling that the result would benefit society. This cautious-
ness would cause Nike to make a greater effort to verify its
statements and as a result protect the clean flow of commercial
information.' 31
124. Id. at 258.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 257.
129. Id. at 257.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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c. Speech on a Matter of Public Debate may be
Commercial in Some Circumstances
While Nike argues that the speech is not commercial be-
cause the statements involved speech on an issue of public de-
bate, the California Supreme Court noted that United States
Supreme Court has cautioned that statements may be properly
categorized as commercial "notwithstanding the fact that they
contain discussions of important public issues."1 32 It has also
held that commercial speech may concern a "subject of intense
public debate."133
As stated previously, the Supreme Court allows content
based regulation on commercial speech because (1) commercial
speakers have enough knowledge of the market and their prod-
uct to evaluate the accuracy of the message; 34 (2) commercial
speech is based on economic self-interest and therefore is not
"particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regula-
tion;" 35 and (3) the government interest in preventing commer-
cial harm justifies the power to regulate speech that is "linked
inextricably" to those transactions. 36 While Nike's statements
included its opinion about labor practices in general in South-
east Asia, the statements also concerned Nike's own practices.
The California Supreme Court conceded that Nike's general
statements about labor practices in Southeast Asia were pro-
tected under the First Amendment. 137 However, the court held
Nike's statements do not continue to be protected when it is
speaking about itself.'38 The court did not want to enable Nike
to "immunize false and misleading product information from
government regulation simply by including references to public
issues."139 The court reasoned that the two forms of speech
were not "inextricably linked" as in Riley because Nike, unlike
132. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68 (1983).
133. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 184
(1999).
134. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976).
135. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
n.6 (1980).
136. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S at 499.
137. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 259 (Cal. 2002).
138. Id. at 260.
139. Id. (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983)).
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the speaker in Riley, was not legally or practically required to
link the two forms of speech. 140
The court further found that this decision does not imper-
missibly restrict or disfavor Nike's point of view since it only
suppresses false and misleading statements of fact.141 Nike is
still free to speak generally about labor practices in Southeast
Asia with full First Amendment protection.
Nike petitioned for certiorari. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari on January 10, 2003.
2. The Dissent
a. Justice Chin's Dissent
Justice Chin objected to the result of the majority opinion
and therefore dissented. Under the majority opinion Nike's
critics have full First Amendment protection. 142 However, when
Nike tries to defend itself it is denied this protection. 143 Accord-
ing to Justice Chin, the reason the majority affords Nike less
protection is simply because it engages in commerce. 44 This re-
sults in the unconstitutional handicapping of one side of an "im-
portant worldwide debate." 45 Justice Chin argues that the
public has the right to receive information from both sides of the
debate, as the First Amendment "guarantees 'the public access
to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and
ideas.' "146
Justice Chin does not agree with the majority's conclusion
that Nike's speech was commercial. Justice Chin views the fact
that Nike did not include the information at issue on its product
labels, inserts, packaging, or commercial advertising intended
to only reach actual or potential customers as evidence that this
speech was not intended to promote the sale of athletic prod-
ucts. 147 Furthermore, the traditional definition of commercial
speech is "speech that does no more than propose a commercial
140. Id. at 260-61.
141. Id. at 261.
142. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 263.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 264 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765,
782 (1978)).
147. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 265.
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transaction."148 Nike's speech clearly went beyond proposing a
commercial transaction. 149 Chin recognizes that the United
States Supreme Court has cautioned against advertisers immu-
nizing false or misleading speech by including references to
public issues. 150 However, Chin interprets this to mean the Su-
preme Court did not want advertisers to include information on
a public issue simply as a means to avoid regulation. 151 That
was not the case here, where Nike's statements were "prompted
and necessitated by public criticism."152 "Nike's labor practices
* . . were the public issue."1 53 Based on this reasoning, Chin
finds that Nike's speech should be fully protected as "essential
to free government."1 54 Chin further finds that even if the
speech were commercial, that it is "inextricably intertwined"
with noncommercial speech and any attempt to separate the
two is "artificial and impractical." 155 Thus, Justice Chin con-
cludes that both sides of a public controversy should have the
full protection of the Constitution. 156
b. Justice Brown's Dissent
Justice Brown remarks that the struggle to differentiate
between commercial and noncommercial speech had created
confusion since the United States Supreme Court created the
commercial doctrine in 1942.157 She further notes that even
though the United States Supreme Court has refrained from de-
fining the elements of commercial speech, the Kasky majority
proposes a new test, which does just that.58 Brown argues that
the majority's test "violates fundamental principles of First
Amendment jurisprudence by making the level of protection...
dependent on the identity of the speaker .. .
148. Id. (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 265-66.
151. Id. at 266.
152. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 266.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 267.
155. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
156. Id. at 268.
157. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 268.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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Justice Brown agrees with Justice Chin, finding that
"Nike's statements are more like noncommercial speech .... ,,160
Nike's labor practices are the public issue and therefore its com-
mercial speech cannot be separated from its noncommercial
speech. 161 Brown distinguishes Bolger on the grounds that in
Bolger the speaker's products "had not become a public is-
sue."162 Additionally, unlike Nike, the manufacturer in Bolger
could have spoken about venereal disease without discussing its
own products. 163 Realistically, Nike could not comment on labor
exploitation without commenting on its own practices. 164
Justice Brown argues that while the United States Su-
preme Court has distinguished commercial speech by its con-
tent, the majority distinguishes it by the identity of the speaker
and the intended audience. 165 Brown notes that contrary to the
majority opinion, the identity of the speaker should not be dis-
positive since the worth of the speech does not depend on the
identity of the speaker. 166 Furthermore, the test is overbroad
and when "taken to its logical conclusion renders all corporate
speech commercial speech." 67 The test "stifl[es] the ability of
speakers engaged in commerce.., to participate in [public] de-
bate.' ' 68 The majority, therefore, "unconstitutionally chills a
corporation's ability to participate in a [public] debate and fa-
vors certain speakers over others." 169
Justice Brown finds the current system, where all speech is
either commercial or noncommercial, and all commercial speech
is afforded the same limited protection, to be rigid, unrealistic,
and constraining.170 The gap between commercial and noncom-
mercial speech is shrinking, but the commercial speech doctrine
160. Id.
161. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 269.
162. Id. at 278.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 270 (citing Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 363 (1977)).
166. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 270-71 (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities
Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765,
783 (1978)).
167. Id. at 272.
168. Id. at 271.
169. Id. at 272-73.
170. Id. at 268-69.
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remains the same. 171 Justice Brown calls on the United States
Supreme Court to create a more nuanced approach to the com-
mercial speech doctrine that accounts for the realities of the
modern world. 172
F. The United States Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to de-
cide (1) "whether a corporation participating in a public debate
may 'be subjected to liability for factual inaccuracies on the the-
ory that its statements are commercial speech because they
might affect consumers' opinions about the business as a good
corporate citizen and thereby affect their purchasing decisions;"
and (2) "whether the 'First Amendment, as applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, permit[s] subjecting
speakers to the legal regime approved by [the California Su-
preme Court].' "173 In June 2003, the Supreme Court dismissed
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.174 Justice Ste-
vens, joined by Justice Ginsberg, and in part by Justice Souter
wrote the concurrence. Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and
O'Connor dissented from the dismissal.
1. Justice Steven's Concurrence
Justice Stevens agreed that certiorari had been improvi-
dently granted for three reasons: (1) the California Supreme
Court's judgment was not final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257; (2) neither party had standing to invoke federal court
jurisdiction; and (3) to avoid the premature adjudication of
novel constitutional questions. 175
Generally, the United States Supreme Court only has ap-
pellate jurisdiction with respect to state litigation "after the
highest state court in which judgment could be had has ren-
dered a final judgment or decree."176 The Court accepts jurisdic-
tion in certain "'situations in which the highest court of a State
has finally determined the federal issue present in a particular
171. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 269.
172. Id. at 269-70.
173. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2555 (2003).
174. Id. at 2555.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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case, but in which there are further proceedings in the lower
state courts to come.' "177 In Cox Broadcasting Corporation v.
Cohn,178 the Court outlined certain categories of cases which
would merit review by the Court even though additional pro-
ceedings were anticipated in the lower courts. Nike argued that
this case fell into the fourth category, which includes cases in
which "'the federal issue ha[d] been finally decided in the state
courts with further proceedings pending in which the party
seeking review' might prevail on nonfederal grounds, 'reversal
of the state court on the federal issue would be preclusive of any
further litigation on the relevant cause of action,' and 'refusal
immediately to review the state-court decisions might seriously
erode federal policy.' 1179 Stevens distinguished the Nike case
from the cases set forth in this category in Cox because in the
cases in Cox the federal issues had been finally decided by the
state court and would have been finally resolved by the Su-
preme Court, regardless of whether the Court affirmed or over-
ruled the lower court's decision. In contrast, Stevens finds that
the Nike case could "take a number of other paths" which could
include further proceedings in the lower courts and would not
necessarily resolve the First Amendment issues in the case. 80
Stevens also finds that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdic-
tion to hear Nike's claims because neither party has standing to
invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts.' 8 ' Kasky does not
have standing because he has no personal stake in the outcome
of the case and is acting as a private attorney general seeking to
enforce California statutes on behalf of the general public of the
State of California. He has not made any federal claim and has
not alleged any injury to himself that is "distinct and palpa-
ble."18 2 Nike relied on the Court's holding in ASARCO, Inc. v.
Kadish,18 3 to establish standing. In ASARCO the Court held:
When a state court has issued a judgment in a case where plain-
tiffs in the original action had no standing to sue under the princi-
ples governing the federal courts, we may exercise our jurisdiction
177. Id. (citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 477 (1975)).
178. Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 477.
179. Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2556 (citing Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 482-83).
180. See id.
181. Id. at 2557 (internal citations omitted).
182. Id.
183. ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989).
378 [Vol. 24:357
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol24/iss1/18
WHAT IS COMMERCIAL SPEECH?
on certiorari if the judgment of the state court cases causes direct,
specific, and concrete injury to the parties who petition for our
review, where the requisites of a case or controversy are also
met.184
Stevens distinguishes ASARCO because in that case the state
court proceedings ended in a declaratory judgment invalidating
a state law. In contrast, there was no "final judgment altering
tangible legal rights" in the Nike case because "the California
Supreme Court merely held that [Kasky's] complaint was suffi-
cient to survive Nike's demurrer and allowed the case to go for-
ward." 1 5 In Steven's opinion ASARCO was not to be applied to
interlocutory rulings that simply allowed a trial to proceed. 8 6
Stevens also bases the decision to dismiss the writ as im-
providently granted on the Court's policy "not [to] anticipate a
question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of de-
ciding it."187 The First Amendment issues presented by this
case are both novel and important because it involves the blend-
ing of commercial speech, noncommercial speech, and debate on
an issue of public importance. The case involves balancing of
two interests. The first is the regulatory interest in protecting
consumers from being misled by corporate misstatements. The
second is the interest in protecting participants involved in
ongoing discussion and debate on public issues from the chilling
effect of the prospect of expensive litigation. Stevens feels the
correct answers to the questions presented by the case would be
better answered in a review of the full factual record and not
just a review of unproven allegations in a pleading. 88
2. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justices Breyer, Kennedy, and O'Conner dissented from
the order dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O'Connor, wrote a
dissenting opinion because "the questions presented directly
concern the freedom of Americans to speak about public matters
184. Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2557 (citing ASARCO Inc., 490 U.S. at 623-24).
185. Id. at 2558.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 2558-59.
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in public debate." 89 He further finds that "no jurisdictional
rule prevents [the Court] from deciding those questions now,
and delay itself may inhibit the exercise of constitutionally pro-
tected rights of free speech without making the issue signifi-
cantly easier to decide later on."190
Breyer disagrees with Steven's conclusion that both parties
lack standing. Breyer finds that while Kasky would have
trouble proving he has standing, it was Nike that brought the
case to the Supreme Court and Nike has standing.' 9' Kasky's
enforcement of the California law threatens to discourage Nike
from engaging in speech, which would be an "injury in fact." In
the past, the Court has found that "the enforcement of such a
law [causes] a constitutional injury even if the enforcement pro-
ceedings are not complete." 92 Unlike Stevens, Breyer sees no
meaningful difference between the ASARCO case and the in-
stant case. 9
3
Breyer finds that although the Court's jurisdiction is lim-
ited to "final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had," the California
Supreme Court's decision, while technically interim, is a "final
judgment or decree" for jurisdictional purposes. 194 Cox Broad-
casting v. Cohn set forth four criteria to determine if a decision
falls within the "fourth category." They are:
(1) "[T~he federal issue has been finally decided in the state
courts";
(2) in further pending proceedings, "the party seeking review here
might prevail on the merits on nonfederal grounds, thus render-
ing unnecessary review of the federal issue by [the Supreme]
Court";
(3) "reversal of the state court on the federal issue would be
preclusive of any further litigation on the relevant cause of action
rather than merely controlling the nature and character of, or de-
189. Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2560.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 2560-61 (citing Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 459 n.7 (1987); First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785 n.21 (1978); Steffel v. Thomp-
son, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52-53
(1971)).
193. Id. at 2561-62.
194. Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2562 (internal quotations omitted).
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termining the admissibility of evidence in, the state proceedings
still to come"; and
(4) "a refusal immediately to review the state-court decisions
might seriously erode federal policy."1 95
Breyer analyzes each of the four criteria and finds that each "is
satisfied in this case.) 196
The first criterion is whether the federal issue has been fi-
nally decided in the state courts. 197 The California Supreme
Court considered nine specific Nike communications and deter-
mined that all of the speech in question was commercial, and
therefore may be prohibited if deemed false or misleading.198
According to Breyer, the California Supreme Court finally de-
cided the federal issue and nothing remains to be decided on
that federal question. The possibility that related federal ques-
tions might arise upon remand for trial should not bar review
since this possibility is always present in ongoing litigation and
was even present in Cox.199
The second criterion is that "in further pending proceed-
ings, 'the party seeking review... might prevail on the merits
on nonfederal grounds, thus rendering unnecessary review of
the federal issue by [the Supreme] Court.' ",200 This criterion is
satisfied because if Nike were to show that its statements are
neither false nor misleading, then it could prove that the state-
ments do not constitute unfair competition or false advertising
under the California law and it would prevail on nonfederal
grounds. 20
The third criterion is that " 'reversal of the state court on
the federal issue would be preclusive of any further litigation on
the relevant cause of action rather than merely controlling the
nature and character of, or determining the admissibility of evi-
dence in, the state proceedings still to come.' "202 This is techni-
cally satisfied as well. If the Supreme Court were to reverse the
California Supreme Court, it would reinstate the judgment of
195. Id. (citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 482-83 (1975)).
196. Id. at 2562.
197. Id. (citing Cox Broad.Corp., 420 U.S. at 482-83).
198. Id. at 2563 (citing Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 (Cal. 2002)).
199. Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2563.
200. Id. at 2562.
201. Id. at 2564.
202. Id. at 2562 (citing Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 482-83).
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the California intermediate court and affirm dismissal of the
complaint with no leave to amend. 20 3 Breyer concedes that the
Supreme Court may not reverse the California Supreme Court
outright and may take some middle ground. However, Breyer
does not see this as significant since the criteria specifies the
effect of reversal and not some other disposition.20 4 Further,
Breyer sees reversal as a serious possibility for a number of rea-
sons. First, he would apply the public speech principle because
the speech involves a mixture of commercial and noncommer-
cial elements. The speech regulation would likely not survive
this heightened scrutiny and would therefore merit a rever-
sal.20 5 Second, the speech involved has predominantly noncom-
mercial characteristics concerning matters of significant public
interest and active controversy, with which the commercial
characteristics are "inextricably intertwined."20 6 Third, a pri-
vate "false advertising" action by a person who has suffered no
injury imposes a serious burden upon speech when extended to
encompass the type of speech at issue. The burden is even
greater because the California law imposes liability based on
negligence, without fault. 20 7
The fourth criterion is that "a refusal immediately to re-
view the state-court decisions might seriously erode federal pol-
icy."208 Breyer considers this criterion satisfied because refusal
to immediately review the California Supreme Court's decision
will seriously erode the federal constitutional policy in favor of
free speech.20 9 Breyer finds that "[i]f permitted to stand, the
state court's decision may well "chill" the exercise of free speech
rights."210 Corporations doing business in California may hesi-
tate to participate in public debate in fear of potential lawsuits
and legal liability. The failure of these corporations to commu-
203. Id. at 2564.
204. Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2564.
205. Id. at 2565.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 2566.
208. Id. at 2568 (citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 482-83
(1975)).
209. Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2568.
210. Id.
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nicate on issues of public debate may limit the supply of infor-
mation to journalists and consequently the public. 211
Breyer, finding "no good reason for postponing the deci-
sion," would not dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.212
III. Significance of the Case to the Definition of
Commercial Speech
A. An Overbroad Definition of Commercial Speech
Because the Supreme Court of the United States did not
review the Supreme Court of California's decision in Kasky v.
Nike the definition of commercial speech remains significantly
altered. The Bolger Court held that the presence of advertising
format, product references and economic motivation is "strong
evidence" that speech is commercial. 213 In Kasky, the Supreme
Court of California redefined these terms. It held that speech in
advertising format is speech about a product or service, by the
person offering that product or service, directed at those who
would be willing to purchase that product or service.21 4 The
court defined product references as not merely statements
about price, quality, and availability, but also statements about
the how the product is manufactured and distributed, and the
identity and qualifications of those manufacturing and selling
the product.215 The court further extended this definition to
statements made in a public relations campaign in an effort to
enhance the image of the product, its manufacturer, or its
seller.21 6 Since most, if not all, public relations campaigns are
intended to have a positive effect on a corporation's image,
under this rule all statements contained in press releases would
be considered product references. The court in Kasky also held
that speech has an economic motivation when it is intended to
lead to commercial transactions. 217
The court then determined, based on these definitions, that
the Bolger holding supported its own holding that commercial
211. Id.
212. Id. at 2569.
213. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67.
214. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 256.
215. Id. at 257.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 256.
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speech is speech by a commercial speaker to an intended com-
mercial audience making representations of fact of a commer-
cial nature. 218 The court held that although Nike addressed the
public generally, the statements were also intended to reach po-
tential consumers. 219 As long as the decision of the Supreme
Court of California remains good law, any public statement by a
corporation is a statement made to an intended commercial au-
dience since the message could potentially reach customers. Af-
firming Kasky and upholding these definitions would broaden
the definition of commercial speech and allow extensive regula-
tion of speech by corporate speakers.
B. Corporate Speakers will be Chilled
The Kasky majority claims that their decision "in no way
prohibits any business enterprise from speaking out on issues of
public importance or from vigorously defending its own labor
practices" as long as they speak truthfully.2 0 This claim fails to
take into account two points: (1) the Kasky decision does not
just apply to knowingly false speech, but to negligently mislead-
ing speech; and (2) corporations must often speak out before all
of the facts are known.
In the past, corporations often spoke out in response to crit-
ics. For example, McDonalds has publicly spoken out against
critics who claim that "fast-food jobs are dead-end jobs" and
that the company encourages obesity. 221 A much more dramatic
example of a company speaking out to the public was the Tyle-
nol tampering incident. In 1982, seven people died after taking
Tylenol capsules laced with cyanide. 222 Johnson and Johnson
chose to speak to the public within hours of the first news of the
deaths, before they were fully aware where the cyanide had
218. Id. at 258.
219. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 258.
220. Id. at 247.
221. See, e.g., Bonnie Harris, In Fast Food, Some See Fast Track Jobs: A
chance for stability, career growth and higher salaries is luring many Latinos to the
industry, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2001, at C1 (quoting a McDonald's spokesman about
jobs with the company); Meredith May, Teachers Sizzle Over Fast Food Fund-
Raiser, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 15, 2002, at Al (in which a McDonald's spokeswoman
responded to claims that McDonald's encourages obesity).
222. See, e.g., Michael Waldholz, Johnson & Johnson Says It Is Convinced
Tylenol Poisoning Was Isolated Incident, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1986, available at
1986 WL-WSJ 268506.
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originated. 223 The Kasky decision, as it now stands, will chill
much of this type of speech. Under the Kasky decision both
McDonalds and Johnson and Johnson would be caught between
the proverbial "rock and a hard place." If the company speaks
out against its critics it risks a potential lawsuit under the strict
liability standard of Kasky.224 If they do not speak out they risk
the public perceiving their silence as indicia of guilt.
225
The majority reasoned that economic motivation will lessen
the chilling effect of the Kasky decision. 226 In other words, com-
panies will risk a potential lawsuit in order to avoid being tried
in the court of public opinion. However, since the Kasky ruling
the number of United States companies that have publicly is-
sued corporate responsibility reports has significantly de-
creased. 227 Furthermore, small companies are more at risk of
having their speech chilled. A large corporation has the finan-
cial and public relations resources to withstand a public law-
suit. Smaller companies, without these resources, will not be
able to take the risk of a lawsuit and will refrain from speaking
out against their critics.
IV. Criticism
A. Nike's Statements are Not Commercial Speech
1. Nike's Statements Did Not Propose a Commercial
Transaction
If speech is not commercial in nature it is entitled to full
First Amendment protection and cannot be prohibited for being
223. See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Tylenol Posts an Apparent Recovery, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 25, 1982, at A30.
224. The plaintiff in Kasky alleged that Nike's false and misleading state-
ments were the result of "negligence and carelessness." Kasky, 45 P.3d at 248.
225. See, e.g., Sandi Sonnenfeld, Media Policy-What Media Policy?, HARv.
Bus. REV., Aug. 1, 1994, at 18, 20. ("There was a time when 'no comment' meant
simply 'no comment.' But today when a company spokesperson says 'no comment,'
it implies the organization has something to hide."). See also Al Frank, No Com-
ment = No Credibility, N.J. STAR-LEDGER, Aug. 6, 2002 (62% of respondents to an
Opinion Research Corp. study equated "no comment" with guilt).
226. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 257.
227. See Gary Young, Nike Ruling: Just How Chilling Is It?, NAT'L L. J., Jan.
20, 2003, at A9 (the number of corporate responsibility reports has dropped from
seventy-eight (78) in 2001 to fifty-eight (58) in 2002).
3852003]
29
PACE LAW REVIEW
false or misleading. 228 In Board of Trustees, State University of
New York v. Fox, the Court held that the "Central Hudson" defi-
nition of "speech proposing a commercial transaction" was the
"test for identifying commercial speech. '229 The speech involved
in this case does not propose a commercial transaction. Nike's
press material presented its side of an ongoing argument con-
cerning its labor practices in Southeast Asia. The statements
did not specifically mention any of Nike's products.
While the Court has deemed alcohol content labels and
statements on letterhead to be commercial speech, in both
Rubin and Ibanez the speech in question was closely connected
with the product being sold. 230 The statements were intended to
be seen by potential consumers. 231 In the instant case, the
statement was not attached in any way to the product being
sold, but instead was published in newspapers for all interested
parties to read, not just potential consumers. Additionally, in
Rubin and Ibanez the category of the speech-commercial or
noncommercial-was not at issue.232 In both instances the
speakers themselves considered the speech to be commercial in
nature and the Court did not see fit to disagree. 233
2. Nike's Statements Do Not Satisfy the Bolger Test
In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. the Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether informational pamphlets discuss-
ing the desirability and availability of prophylactics were
commercial speech.234 The Court held that the fact that the
pamphlets were advertisements did not make them commercial
speech since paid advertisements are sometimes used to convey
political or other messages unconnected to a product, service, or
commercial transaction.235 Similarly, the fact that Nike partici-
pated in the debate through the use of paid advertisements does
228. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 495 (1995) ("Some false and
misleading statements are entitled to First Amendment protection in the political
realm.") (Stevens, J., concurring).
229. Fox, 492 U.S. at 473-74.
230. See Rubin, 514 U.S. at 476; Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 136.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See Rubin, 514 U.S. at 475; Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 136, 142.
234. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 65.
235. Id. at 66.
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not automatically make their statements commercial in nature.
The Court also held that references to specific products and the
economic motivation of the speaker were each, by themselves,
insufficient to make the speech commercial. 236 The Court con-
cluded that three factors-advertising format, product refer-
ences, and commercial motivation-combined provided strong
support for characterizing speech as commercial. 237 Many of
Nike's statements were in the form of letters to the editor and
letters to athletic directors of Universities, which are not tradi-
tional advertising formats. Additionally, there were no specific
product references. The statements referred to company prac-
tices in general. Admittedly, Nike may have had an economic
motivation for speaking out. The bad publicity that Nike was
receiving may have caused them to fear a decline in sales, as
Nike consumers tend to be brand loyal. 238 But in spite of this
loyalty, many consumers do not want to feel that they are sup-
porting irresponsible labor practices and may choose to
purchase another brand that does not carry with it the guilt of
indirectly supporting these practices. 239 However, economic mo-
tivation would be present for any company being publicly criti-
cized. Public scrutiny can easily result in decreased sales and a
lower stock price, and therefore there will always be an eco-
nomic motivation for a company to defend itself. The Court
noted that each Bolger factor does not need to be present for
speech to be commercial. 240 However, it would be a far stretch
to think that Nike's economic motivation was the type of "strong
evidence" the Court was referring to in Bolger. It is only by ex-
panding the definitions of the factors used in Bolger, as the Su-
236. Id. at 67.
237. Id.
238. See, e.g., David Lazarus, Corporate Tribalism: Just Can't Do It, S.F.
CHRON., Apr. 28, 2002, at G1 (profiling Nike customer, Alexander Capito, who
wears Nike head-to-toe because it makes him "feel good"); Shelly Branch, What's in
a Name: Not Much According to Clothes Shoppers, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2002, at
B4 (Twenty-three percent (23%) of men and twenty-six percent (26%) of women
rate Nike as their favorite brand.).
239. Maureen Tkacik, Just How Far Does First Amendment Protection Go?,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2003, at B1 (Student activists at the University of North
Carolina lobbied coaches and administrators to cancel its contract with Nike be-
cause of Nike's allegedly unfair labor practices.).
240. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68 n.14.
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preme Court of California did, that an argument can be made
that Nike's speech is commercial.
Furthermore, in Justice Stevens' concurrence in Bolger, he
stated that "governmental suppression of a specific point of
view strikes at the core of First Amendment values."241 The
speech at issue here was Nike's point of view on an issue of pub-
lic debate-its own labor practices. Clearly, this is the type of
speech that the First Amendment was intended to protect.
3. The Contingencies of Our Time Necessitate The Free
Dissemination of Facts Regarding International
Labor Conditions
Thornhill v. Alabama involved the right of a person to
picket a company over a labor dispute. 242 On the morning of his
arrest Byron Thornhill was seen on the picket line outside of
the Brown Wood Preserving Company with six or eight other
men.243 Several weeks earlier a strike order had been issued by
a Union and since that time a picket line had been maintained
at the plant twenty-four hours a day.244 Thornhill was con-
victed under an Alabama statute, which made it illegal to
"picket the works or place of business of other persons, firms,
corporations, or associations of persons, for the purpose of hin-
dering, delaying, interfering with or injuring any lawful busi-
ness or enterprise." 245 Thornhill argued that the law was
unconstitutional because it deprived him of, inter alia, the free-
dom of speech. 246 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction
and held that the "dissemination of information concerning the
facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of
free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution."247 The
Court further held that the "[fireedom of discussion, if it would
fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all is-
sues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable
the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their pe-
241. Id. at 84 (Stevens, J. concurring).
242. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
243. Id. at 94.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 91.
246. Id. at 92-93.
247. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 102.
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riod."248 The Court felt that the "circumstances of [the] times"
in 1940 necessitated the free dissemination of the facts regard-
ing a labor dispute. 249 The Court based this determination on
the fact that satisfactory hours, wages, and working conditions
were benefits to be bargained for in order to benefit that genera-
tion and the next.250 The Court stated "the practices in a single
factory may have economic repercussions upon a whole region
and affect widespread systems of marketing."251 Because of
this, the free discussion of labor conditions was found to be "in-
dispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the process of
popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial
society."25 2 Similarly, the circumstances of our times necessi-
tate the dissemination of information regarding corporate re-
sponsibility, including labor practices. Many American
companies have moved their manufacturing divisions overseas
or, as Nike does, receive their manufactured goods from subcon-
tractors. 253 This has spurred a new issue of public debate: the
level of responsibility American companies have for the labor
practices of the international subcontractors, the supervision of
these companies, and whether American companies abide by
their own codes of conduct when it comes to these overseas sub-
contractors. 254 Arguably, with many average citizens invested
in the stock market, corporate governance is more of a concern
to some people than politics. 255 Additionally, with the legisla-
ture passing laws such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 256 corporate
governance has become a political issue.
257
248. Id. (emphasis in original).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 103.
251. Id.
252. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 103.
253. See, e.g., Fred Dickey, Levi Strauss and the Price We Pay: The Cost of
Apparel Has Declined for a Quarter Century, Helping Make Americans the Best-
Clothed People in History; All is Right in the World, Unless You Ask How it Hap-
pened, L.A. TIMES MAG., Dec. 1, 2002, at 114.
254. See generally id.
255. See Michael Weiser & Jeff Zilka, Nader for CEO: Sarbanes-Oxley makes
running a corporation like campaigning for elective office, BARRON'S, Jan. 27, 2003,
at 33.
256. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (institut-
ing several measures designed to improve corporate governance).
257. Weiser & Zilka, supra note 255.
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4. Corporate Speakers Should Not be Deprived of their
First Amendment Rights
The 1978 case of First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
involved national banking associations and business corpora-
tions that wished to publicize their views opposing a referen-
dum proposal to amend the Massachusetts Constitution.258
Massachusetts had a statute which made it a crime for "speci-
fied business corporations from making contributions or ex-
penditures 'for the purpose of ... influencing or affecting the
vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one
materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of
the corporation.' ",259 A group of businesses brought an action to
challenge the constitutionality of the Massachusetts statute.260
Specifically, the businesses alleged that the statute violated the
First Amendment, and the Due Process and Equal Protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.261 The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court held that the First Amendment rights
of a corporation are limited to issues that materially affect its
business, property, or assets.262 The United States Supreme
Court found that the speech proposed by the businesses was at
the heart of First Amendment protection. 263 The Court found
the issue in Bellotti to be "whether the corporate identity of
[the] speaker deprives the proposed speech of what otherwise
would be its clear entitlement to protection."264 The Court
found the fact that the speakers were corporations did not make
the speech any less "indispensable to decision making in a de-
mocracy. "'265 It held "the inherent worth of the speech in terms
of its capacity to inform the public does not depend upon the
identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union,
or individual."266 In addition, the Court held that where the leg-
islature suppresses speech, in an attempt to give one side of a
debatable issue an advantage in expressing its views, the First
258. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 765 (1978).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 769.
262. Id. at 767.
263. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776.
264. Id. at 778.
265. Id. at 777.
266. Id.
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Amendment is plainly offended. 267 Similarly, when the Califor-
nia statute is applied to Nike it suppresses its views on a debat-
able issue-Nike's labor practices in Southeast Asia. In
Bellotti, the Court felt there was no danger in letting a wealthy
corporation speak out on an issue of public debate because:
[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibil-
ity for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting
arguments. They must consider, in making their judgment, the
source and credibility of the advocate. But if there be any danger
that the people cannot evaluate the information and arguments
advanced .. .it is a danger contemplated by the Framers of the
First Amendment. 268
The Court's rational still holds true today. In fact, even one
of Nike's most vocal critics, Bob Herbert of the New York Times,
feels that Nike should be free to participate in this debate with
the full protection of the First Amendment. 269 Those interested
in Nike's labor practices should be allowed to hear both sides of
the issue and make a determination as to the credibility of the
source for themselves. Critics may argue that Nike's state-
ments, if false, may have caused consumers who would be mor-
ally opposed to purchasing Nike's products if they knew the
truth, to purchase the products and unknowingly support irre-
sponsible labor practices. However, due to the extensive media
coverage of the criticism it is unlikely that a potential consumer
would have been exposed to Nike's side of the debate, but not
that of the critics. The general consumer is likely to understand
that Nike has some economic motivation to speak out against
its critics and can consider this when evaluating Nike's
credibility.
V. Conclusion and Suggestion
The source of the problem is the test the United States Su-
preme Court laid down in Bolger.270 This test gives too much
267. Id. at 785-86.
268. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792.
269. Bob Herbert, Let Nike Stay in the Game, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2002, at
A21.
270. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67 (holding that the presence of advertising for-
mat, product references, and commercial motivation provide "strong support" for
characterizing speech as commercial).
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discretion for the circuit courts to label speech commercial.
This discretion results in speech being regulated with a lack of
uniformity. The First Amendment's protection of the freedom of
speech should be applied broadly. Because commercial speech
is entitled to less protection than noncommercial speech, the
distinction between the two should be made carefully and uni-
formly. The Supreme Court of the United States should have
taken the opportunity presented by Kasky v. Nike to articulate
a new rule. Because the Court declined this opportunity a clear
definition of commercial speech is still needed.
There are reasons to keep the definition amorphous. At one
time an advertisement, a classic form of commercial speech,
was easily identified. Today it is sometimes difficult to deter-
mine when advertising ends and entertainment begins. One
need only watch reality programming such as "American Idol"
to see examples of corporate sponsorship raised to such a level
that the argument could be made that the show itself is merely
proposing a commercial transaction (the sales of Coca-Cola bev-
erages and Ford cars) and the talent show is just a device to
induce consumers to watch the commercial.2 71 With advertising
format changing so rapidly, an amorphous definition of com-
mercial speech would allow the courts to change with it. How-
ever, for the same reason, the growing entanglement of
advertisement and entertainment, the Court should be careful
not to regulate more speech than necessary.
The Court can create an amorphous test, provided there is
an exception for speech on public issues. When a company's
practices have become an issue of public debate, the company
itself should be entitled to participate in that debate with the
same full First Amendment protection enjoyed by others who
speak on the topic. The fact that the topic involved is the com-
pany's practices should not convert the statement into commer-
cial speech. This rule would not permit a company to have free
reign to knowingly speak about its corporate practices in a false
or misleading way. By applying the "actual malice" standard
271. See generally Stuart Elliot, I have seen the future of advertising and it is
... American Idol?, CAMPAIGN, Sept. 20, 2002, at P17; Theresa Howard, Real Win-
ner of "American Idol": Coke, USA TODAY, Sept. 9, 2002, at B6; Wayne Friedman,
Madison + Vine: Product Integrators Manage Learning Curve: Marriages of Mar-
keters, Media Hot, But Risks are Still Plenty, AD. AGE, Oct. 21, 2002, at 18.
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found in New York Times v. Sullivan272 consumers will be pro-
tected from knowingly false statements while corporations will
have the freedom they need to participate in public debates.
Under this rule, if a company speaks on a matter of public de-
bate, which concerns its own practices, it will only be liable for
false statements that it knew or should have known were false
or misleading. To hold otherwise would chill commercial speak-
ers unnecessarily.
272. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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